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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Thirty-year-old Jess Wade

was on probation for sexual battery

a minor.

After Mr. Yost admitted to violating his probation, the district court revoked probation,
imposed his underlying twenty-five year sentence, and then reduced the fixed portion of
his sentence from five to three years. Mr. Yost now appeals from the district court's
order revoking probation. Mr. Yost contends that his rights under the Due Process
Clause and Equal Protection Clause were violated by the district court's revocation of
his probation based primarily on his indigent status. Mr. Yost also contends that the
district court abused its discretion by revoking probation or by failing to further reduce
his sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April of 2013, Mr. Yost pied guilty to sexual battery of a minor of sixteen or
seventeen years of age. (R., pp.53-54, 69-70, 80-81.) The district court sentenced him
to twenty-five years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction ("a rider"). (R., pp.7985.) At the rider review hearing in January of 2014, the district court suspended
execution of Mr. Yost's sentence and placed him on probation for ten years. (R., pp.9192, 93-97.) The district court also set a status hearing for April of 2014 to evaluate
Mr. Yost's performance on probation. (R , pp.92, 96.)
Before the April status hearing, a Special Progress Report was provided to the
district court. (R., p.120.) This Report stated that Mr. Yost was in compliance with most
of the terms of his probation. (R., p.120.) At the status hearing, the district court noted
that the "[r]eport looks positive" and told Mr. Yost to "[k]eep up the good work."
(R., p.122.)

1

On November 20, 2014, a Report of Probation Violation was filed with the district
(R., pp.126-29.) On January 26,

1)

15, Mr. Yost admitted to three violations for

failure to attend sex offender treatment; (2) view and possession of pornographic

media; and (3) access to the Internet to view pornography. 1 (R., pp.126-27, 146;
Vol. 1, 2 p.8, L. 13-p.10, L.20.) With regard to the first violation, the only reason
Mr. Yost had failed to attend treatment was because the program, H&H Treatment,
discharged him for owing $324.00. (R., p.130.)
At the disposition hearing on March 2, 2015, Mr. Yost's counsel explained that
Mr. Yost had "substantially struggled" to have the funds to pay for sex offender
treatment (Tr. Vol. I, p.16, Ls.21-24.) His counsel also explained:
Mr. Yost understands how important that treatment is, Judge. And I think
he actually gets a lot out of the treatment but has really struggled finding
employment that works with that schedule and being able to pay. And
when H&H is the only treatment provider in the vicinity, he's kind of at their
mercy when he's unable to pay. And he understands why they would want
to be paid in advance, but he is stuck between a veritable rock and a hard
place where if he doesn't have the money to pay rent or those things, he's
in violation of his probation, but if he doesn't pay for H&H, he's booted out
of treatment and is in violation of his probation.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.18, Ls 1-14.) His counsel also argued that the other probation violations for
accessing the Internet and viewing pornography were the result of Mr. Yost's lapse in
treatment due to his inability to pay. (Tr. Vol. I, p.18, L.22-p.19, L.8.) Since the
admit/deny hearing in January of 2015, however, Mr. Yost had gotten the funds to pay
the $324.00 balance, so he was eligible to start treatment again. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, Ls.815.) In addition, Mr. Yost informed the district court that he had been clean and sober

The State withdrew a fourth alleged violation regarding possession of sexually explicit
images and videos of the victim. (R., p.146; Tr. Vol. I, p.10, L.21-p.11, L.3.)
2 There are two transcripts on the appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, includes the
admit/deny hearing and first disposition hearing, held on March 2, 2015. The second,
cited as Volume 11, includes the second disposition hearing, held on June 8, 2015.
1

2

for almost two years, which was the longest time he had been sober since he was a
teenager. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, Ls.10-13.)

district court decided to

the disposition

for three months to see that Mr. Yost was fully engaged in treatment, current on
his financial obligations, and otherwise in compliance with the terms of probation.
(Tr. VoL I, p.21, Ls.14-22.)
On June 8, 2015, the district court held a second disposition hearing.
(R., pp.153-54.) A second Special Progress Report provided that Mr. Yost was not in
compliance with the terms of his probation. (R., p.150.) This Report stated that Mr. Yost
owed money towards the cost of supervision. (R., p.150.) It also stated that Mr. Yost
was noncompliant with the requirement of sex offender treatment for his failure to attend
certain group or individual sessions and that Mr. Yost failed to take a "biannual
maintenance polygraph examination." (R., p.150.) Mr. Yost's counsel again explained
that the noncompliance was due to financial issues. 3 (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.25-p.8, L.24.)
Mr. Yost struggled to pay all of his expenses, including rent, the cost of supervision, the
cost of sex offender treatment, the cost for polygraph tests, living expenses like gas and
insurance to get to work, and other debts. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.25-p.8, L.24.) The district
court revoked probation and imposed the underlying twenty-five year sentence, with five
years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.10, Ls.13-45.) The district court then reduced the fixed portion
of Mr. Yost's sentence to three years. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.10, Ls.16-18.)
The district court entered an Order on Motion to Revoke Probation. (R., pp.15558.) Mr. Yost filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's order. (R., pp.161-

63.)

Mr. Yost also submitted documentation of his exact attendance record and the
invoices from H&H Treatment. (Def.'s Ex. A.)

3

3

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Yost's equal protection and due process rights
when it revoked probation due to Mr. Yost's indigent status?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Yost's probation?

4

ARGUMENT

L
The District Court Violated Mr. Yost's Equal Protection And Due Process Rights When It
Revoked Probation Due To Mr. Yost's Indigent Status
Even though the district court's decision to revoke probation is a matter within the
court's discretion, State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987), the court's decision
must be consistent with "constitutional standards." State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 607
(Ct. App. 2007). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
"equal protection of the laws," and the Due Process Clause prohibits the State from
depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
Const., amend. XIV. Consistent with these constitutional standards, a deprivation of
liberty based solely on the individual's indigent status may run contrary to the
"fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Bearden v. Georgia,
461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983), see also Braaten, 144 Idaho at 608. That is so because
"there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial"-or sentence-"a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has." Bearden, 461 U.S. at 664 (quoting Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion)).
Mr. Yost contends that his equal protection and due process rights were violated
by the district court's revocation of his probation due to his indigent status. The district
court revoked probation because Mr. Yost failed to attend sex offender treatment, but
the only reason Mr. Yost failed to attend treatment was due to his inability to pay.
imprisoning Mr. Yost for his poverty is constitutionally impermissible.
To determine whether a criminal defendant's indigence may permissibly affect
the sentence, the Court applies a balancing test with elements of both the due process

5

equal protection analyses. See Braaten, 144 Idaho at 608. Separately, these two
are as follows:
To determine whether this differential treatment [based on indigency]
violates the Equal Protection Clause, one must determine whether, and
under what circumstances, a defendant's indigent status may be
considered in the decision whether to revoke probation. This is
substantially similar to asking directly the due process question of whether
and when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary for the State to revoke
probation when an indigent is unable to pay the fine.
Braaten, 144 Idaho 308-09 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S at 665-66). In Bearden, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether the defendant's equal protection
and due process rights were violated by the revocation of his probation due to his failure
to pay the imposed fine and restitution. 461 U.S at 665-73. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that the revocation of probation was "permissible" only if the defendant "did not
make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay his fine" or "alternate punishment is not
adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence." Id. at 674; see
also id. at 672-73. Whether this issue is '·analyzed in terms of equal protection or due
process," the factors to be considered are: "the nature of the individual interest affected,
the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative
means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the
purpose .... " Braaten, 144 Idaho at 609 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666 (alterations
in original)). Imprisoning a defendant "solely because he lacks funds to pay the fine,"
without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or examining alternatives, is
constitutionally impermissible. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 674.
As an initial matter, Mr. Yost raises this issue under the fundamental error
standard from State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Under this standard, the Court may
review an unobjected-to error for the first time on appeal if the error: "( 1) violates one or
6

more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the
additional information not
as to whether the failure

in

appellate

object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not

harmless." Id. at 228. In this case, Mr. Yost did not object to the error, and thus the
fundamental error standard applies to his claim. Mr. Yost has the burden to demonstrate
all three prongs of the Perry standard. Id.

A

The District Court Violated Mr. Yost's Constitutional Rights To Equal Protection
And Due Process Of Law
Under the first prong, Mr. Yost must show a violation of one or more unwaived

constitutional rights. See id. Mr. Yost contends that his unwaived constitutional rights to
due process and equal protection were violated by the district court's revocation of
probation Using the balancing test from Bearden, Mr. Yost's individual liberty interest
outweighed the State's penological interests, and the district court failed to consider
alternate means to effectuate the State's interests. See Braaten, 144 Idaho at 608
(discussing the balancing test).
Examining the first factor of "the nature of the individual interest," Mr. Yost has a
constitutionally-protected interest in remaining on probation. The U.S. Supreme Court
held as much in Bearden, recognizing "the significant interest of the individual in
remaining on probation." 461 U.S. at 671 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). The Court of Appeals in Braaten
also recognized this liberty interest. 144 Idaho at 609 C[T)he United States Supreme
Court has held that one convicted of a crime has a significant liberty interest in
remaining on probation or parole.") The Court of Appeals explained that this liberty
interest "is so because [t]here is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty
7

one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desired." Id. at
0 (alteration in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal
442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)). Moreover, the extent to which Mr. Yost's liberty
interest is affected by the disposition proceeding is great-Mr. Yost's probation would
be either revoked or reinstated based on the district court's decision.
"The next factor to be weighed is the State's interest or purpose and the
rationality of the connection between this purpose and the means used to accomplish
it." Id. at 610. This factor also considers "the existence of alternate means" to effectuate
the State's purpose. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666; see also State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho
102, 105 (2009) (discussing the required analysis of alternate means for non-willful
violations generally). The U.S. Supreme Court has provided considerable guidance on
this factor in the context of a revocation of probation. The U.S. Supreme Court
cknowledged, 'The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appropriately
punishing persons-rich and poor-who violate its criminal laws. A defendant's poverty
in no way immunizes him from punishment." Id. at 669. 'The decision to place the
defendant on probation, however, reflects a determination by the sentencing court that
the State's penological interests do not require imprisonment." Id. at 670. Thus, the
State's interests in punishment and deterrence are diminished when the defendant is
already determined to be an appropriate candidate for probation. Moreover, a

probationer, such as Mr. Yost, who has made "sufficient bona fide efforts" to pay for
treatment, and "who has complied with the other conditions of probation," 4 "has

Mr. Yost acknowledges the two other probation violations for accessing the Internet
and viewing pornography. But, as argued by his counsel, these violations occurred only
because Mr. Yost was discharged from his treatment due to his inability to pay. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.18, L.22-p.19, L.8.) Once Mr. Yost saved up enough money to pay for treatment

4
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a willingness to pay his debt to society and an ability to conform his
to

norms. Id. This further diminishes

requirement

imprisonment

the State's interests." Id.
Certainly, the State has an interest "in rehabilitating the probationer and
protecting society." Id. at 671. The Court of Appeals examined this interest in the
relinquishment context: "[T]he State has a strong and legitimate interest in protecting
society from criminals and, therefore, in disallowing probation for an offender if the
offender cannot be adequately supervised or if his conditional release will present an
undue risk to society." Braaten, 144 Idaho at 610. At the same time, however, a person
cannot be punished solely for his poverty. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671.
Here, Mr. Yost presented an alternate means to effectuate the State's interests of
rehabilitation and protection of society. Mr. Yost specifically requested that he meet with
his probation officer to develop budgeting and money-management skills, with the first
priority being payment of his supervision costs, polygraph expenses, and treatment
fees. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.25-p.7, L.11, p.8, Ls.17-24.) He also demonstrated "sufficient
bona fide efforts" to pay for his treatment, such as working the graveyard shift and
carrying extra money to pay for the treatment sessions. (Tr. Vol. I p.16, L.21-p.17,
L.15, p.18, Ls.1-5; Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.9-p.6, L.6, p.7, L.12-p.8, L.3.) (See also Def.'s Ex.
A of Mr. Yost's payments to H&H Treatment.) There were no claims that Mr. Yost

"willingly refused to pay" for treatment "when he ha[d] the means to pay" or that he
demonstrated "an insufficient concern" for the requirement of treatment. Bearden, 461
U.S. at 668. These kinds of allegations could justify imprisonment at the means to

again, no further violations of this nature occurred. Other than the financial issues,
Mr. Yost was in compliance with the terms of his probation. (R., p.150.)
9

effectuate the State's penological interests Id. But here, Mr. Yost recognized his need
and tried to pay to the best

his abilities. The district court failed to weigh

factors as required by Bearden and Braaten.
As stated in Bearden, "Only if the sentencing court determines that alternatives to
imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet the State's interest in
punishment and deterrence may the State imprison a probationer who has made
sufficient bona fide efforts to pay." 461 U.S. at 672; see also id. C[T]he court must
consider alternate measures of punishment other than imprisonment"); Sanchez, 149
Idaho at 106. Mr. Yost submits that the district court violated his constitutional rights to
due process and equal protection by punishing him for his indigency, without
considering his bona fide efforts to pay and, most importantly, the alternate means to
effectuate the State's interests.

B.

The Constitutional Violation Is Clear From The Record
Second, Mr. Yost submits that this error is clear and plain from the record. See

Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. At the second disposition hearing, the district court stated:

All right The Court, for purposes of disposition, does still consider
the four goals of sentencing. Certainly given the nature of the underlying
offense, protection of society remains this Court's primary concern.
Although, the Court does and must still consider the related goals of
rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence. The Court also does still
consider those factors under 19-2521 to determine whether probation or
some form of incarceration is appropriate. The Court does consider the
character of the offender, the nature of the underlying offense, as well as
Defendant's performance on probation.
The Court is very concerned about the nature of the violation. The
Court, after the admissions were entered, did subsequently hold
disposition open for purposes of allowing the defendant to come into
compliance with the terms and conditions. Certainly, the Court does
understand the financial concerns; however, given the nature of the
underlying offense, if the defendant does not have the financial ability to
fully and completely participate in sex offender treatment, as required in

10

the community, certainly that treatment is available in the correctional
setting and financial ability does not interfere.
It does appear that while Mr. Yost did get re-engaged and began
again attending in April of this year
even then. he missed
of the
eight groups. There's still an indication, as of June 4, 2015, that the
defendant has not scheduled his individual sessions and has not
participated in the required maintenance polygraphs.
Given the serious nature of the offense and the Court having
revoked the defendant's probation, the Court will impose the sentence;
however, the Court will modify the sentence from 25 years unified to 3
years fixed, 22 years indeterminate not to exceed 25 ....
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.9, L.4-p.10, L.18 (emphasis added).) Thus, the district court viewed prison
as the solution to Mr. Yost's financial restrictions, without factoring into its analysis the
alternate measures or Mr. Yost's efforts to pay. Further, there is no tactical or strategic
reason for counsel to fail to object to a constitutional violation that leads directly to
imprisonment. The error is clear from the record-the district court viewed Mr. Yost's
inability to pay for treatment as its justification for imprisonment. See Bearden, 461 U.S.
at 671.

C.

The Error Was Not Harmless
Third, and finally, there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the outcome

of the disposition proceeding. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. If Mr. Yost had the ability to
pay for treatment, along with the cost of supervision, there is no indication from the
record that the district court would have revoked probation. The other violations would
not have occurred but for the lapse in treatment. The evidence indicates that Mr. Yost
would have attended treatment as required and complied with all other terms of his
probation.
In summary, Mr. Yost has met his burden to show that the district court violated
Mr. Yost's unwaived constitutional rights to due process and equal protection when it
revoked probation based primarily on his indigent status. Further, Mr. Yost has shown

11

the error was clear from the record, and the error was not harmless. He respectfully
order revoking probation and remand

that this Court vacate the district
a new disposition hearing.

II
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Yost's Probation
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant's probation
under certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a twostep analysis to review a probation revocation proceeding. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106.
First, the Court determines "whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation."
Id. Second, "[i]f it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his

probation, the Court examines "what should be the consequences of that violation." Id.
The determination of a probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if
any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Mr. Yost does not challenge his admissions to the probation violations.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.13-p.10, L.20.) "When a probationer admits to a direct violation of her
probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required. State v. Peterson,
123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Rather, Mr. Yost submits that the district court abused
its discretion by revoking his probation.
"After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation
and pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." Roy, 113
Idaho at 392. "A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily," however. State v. Lee, 116
Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). "The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision." State v. Mummert,

98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977). "In determining whether to revoke probation a court must
12

consider whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing
adequate protection
court

society." State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274,

consider the defendant's

before

(Ct. App. 1995).

during probation. Roy, 113

Idaho at 392.
In this case, Mr. Yost submits that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation because the violations did not justify revocation. As explained
Mr. Yost's counsel, the only barrier between Mr. Yost and his treatment was its cost.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.16, L.21-p.19, L.14; Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.25-p.8, L.3.) There was no allegation
that Mr. Yost failed to attend treatment for any reason other than his inability to pay.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.2-4.) Mr. Yost wanted treatment, and he fully appreciated the need
for treatment. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, Ls.19-20,

18, Ls.1-2, p 19, Ls.15-22; Tr. Vol. II, p.8,

Ls.10-14.) For example, he worked the graveyard shift at a manufacturing plant to
ensure that he could attend treatment. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, Ls.1-2, p.18. Ls.2-5.) But, like
many individuals, Mr. Yost struggled to follow a budget and stay up-to-date on all his
expenses. Then, in April of 2015, Mr. Yost injured himself at the manufacturing plant,
which compounded his financial difficulties (Tr. Vol II. p.5, Ls.9-17; Def.'s Ex. A,
pp.13-14.) In order to succeed on probation, Mr. Yost simply needed instruction and
guidance to learn how to manage his finances, which he specifically requested at the
second disposition hearing. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.25-p.7, L. 11, p.8, Ls.17-24.) Instead of
punishing Mr. Yost for his inability to pay with a twenty-five year prison sentence,
Mr. Yost should have been given an opportunity to develop these money-management
skills while on probation.
Other facts indicate the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Yost's
probation because his probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. Mr. Yost had
13

been sober for almost two years. (Tr. VoL I, p.20, Ls.10-14.) Remaining sober was an.
accomplishment for
beers a day.

as he began drinking alcohol
Vol. I,

age nineteen, consuming at

Ls.10-14; Presentence Investigation Report

("PSl"), 5 p.36.) Further, the initial probation violations for viewing pornography and
accessing the Internet did not occur again once Mr. Yost had the funds to pay for
treatment. Mr. Yost's counsel explained, "He knows that when he is in treatment and
attending those sessions like he's supposed to be, the issues that arose in that
probation violation don't come up in his life." (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, Ls.10-14.) In fact, the
psychosexual evaluation found that Mr. Yost's treatment needs could be met in the
community. (PSI, p.18.) Similarly, the Addendum to the PSI following Mr. Yost's rider
found that he was amenable to sex offender treatment and recommended probation.
(PSI, pp.52, 55.) In addition, Mr. Yost had full-time employment and a stable residence. 6
(R, p.150.) He also met with his probation officer as directed. (R, p.150.) Based on

these facts, Mr. Yost's probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. Mr. Yost
submits that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation or, in the
alternative, by failing to further reduce his sentence in light of his progress on probation.

5 Citations to the PSI refer to the sixty-three page electronic file titled "Appeal #43313
Jess Wade Yost Cont. Exhibits."
6 Mr. Yost lived with his parents, but he paid them rent. (PSI, p.55; Tr. Vol. 11, p.6, Ls.7-

12.)
14

CONCLUSION
Mr. Yost respectfully requests that the district court's order revoking probation be
vacated and his case be remanded to

district court

a new disposition hearing.

Alternatively, he requests that this Court reinstate probation or further reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 24 th day of November, 2

puty State Appellate Public Defender
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